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Abstract: - Electronic circuits and systems used in mission and safety-critical applications usually employ 
redundancy in the design to overcome arbitrary fault(s) or failure(s) and guarantee the correct operation. In this 
context, the distributed minority and majority voting based redundancy (DMMR) scheme forms an efficient 
alternative to the conventional N-modular redundancy (NMR) scheme for implementing mission and safety-
critical circuits and systems by significantly minimizing their weight and design cost and also their design metrics 
whilst providing a similar degree of fault tolerance. This article presents the first FPGAs based implementation 
of example DMMR circuits and compares it with counterpart NMR circuits on the basis of area occupancy and 
critical path delay viz. area-delay product (ADP). The example DMMR circuits and counterpart NMR circuits 
are able to accommodate the faulty or failure states of 2, 3 and 4 function modules. For physical synthesis, two 
commercial Xilinx FPGAs viz. Spartan 3E and Virtex 5 corresponding to 90nm and 65nm CMOS processes, and 
two radiation-tolerant and military grade Xilinx FPGAs viz. QPro Virtex 2 and QPro Virtex E corresponding to 
150nm and 180nm CMOS processes were considered for the NMR and DMMR circuit realizations which employ 
the 4×4 array multiplier as a representative function module. To achieve a fault tolerance of 2 function modules, 
both the DMMR and the NMR schemes provide near similar mean ADPs across all the four FPGAs. But while 
achieving a fault tolerance of 3 function modules the DMMR features reduced ADP by 44.5% on average 
compared to the NMR, and in achieving a fault tolerance of 4 function modules the DMMR reports reduced ADP 
by 56.5% on average compared to the NMR with respect to all the four FPGAs considered.              
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1 Introduction 
Mission and safety-critical circuits and systems used 
in niche applications such as space, aerospace, 
defense, nuclear, banking and finance such as 
commercial banking systems and stock exchanges 
and other applications such as power systems, 
industrial automation and control etc. inherently 
employ redundancy in the design to cope with 
arbitrary function module fault(s) or failure(s) and 
still guarantee the correct operation [1]. Here the term 
‘function module’ refers to any arbitrary electronic 
circuit or system.  
     In a typical passive N-modular redundant design, 
(N–1) identical copies of a function module are used 
along with the primary function module, and at least 
a majority (N+1)/2 out of the N function modules 
should always maintain the correct operation to 
guarantee the correct operation of the NMR design 
[2]. Therefore the faulty or failure state(s) of at most 
(N–1)/2 function modules is tolerated by the NMR 
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design. The respective output(s) of the N function 
modules are combined using voting element(s) which 
perform majority voting on the function modules 
output(s) and generate the primary outputs.  
     Although the NMR scheme is well established, 
widely understood and used, it tends to be unsuitable 
for coping with more than 2 function module faults 
or failures [3]. When higher fault tolerances are 
demanded by a mission or safety-critical circuit or 
system entirely or selectively, the NMR scheme may 
not be preferable since it would exacerbate the design 
metrics and increase the design weight and cost due 
to the requirement for provision of more identical 
copies of the function module. This in fact assumes 
significance in the light of the observation [4] [5] that 
multiple faults are imminent and are likely to become 
more common in nanometer scale electronic designs 
deployed in mission and safety-critical applications 
owing to the adverse impact of radiation phenomena 
on small device geometries. In order to overcome 
these, higher levels of redundancy may be inevitable 
at least selectively in a mission or safety-critical 
circuit or system design [6], i.e. higher levels of 
redundancy may have to be implemented selectively 
in at least the sensitive portions of a mission or 
safety-critical electronic circuit or system.  
     To mitigate the excessive design overheads 
associated with higher order NMR designs whilst 
providing similar degree(s) of fault tolerance the 
DMMR scheme was proposed [7]. In a DMMR 
scheme, supposing M identical function modules are 
considered, they are split into two groups as 3 
function modules constituting the majority logic 
group and the remaining (M–3) function modules 
constituting the minority logic group in which case 
the DMMR is labelled as the 3-of-M DMMR. 
Supposing 5 function modules are deployed in the 
majority logic group and (M–5) function modules are 
deployed in the minority logic group, the DMMR 
system is referred to as a 5-of-M DMMR system. It 
was recently shown in [8] that the 3-of-M DMMR 
system architecture is preferable over the 5-of-M 
DMMR system architecture overall in terms of 
system reliability, fault tolerance and the design 
metrics.  
     In the 3-of-M DMMR scheme, in the majority 
logic group, the faulty or failure state of any arbitrary 
function module is tolerated, and in the minority 
logic group a minimum of 1 out of the (M–3) function 
modules should maintain the correct operation. Thus 
the minority logic group can easily mask the faulty or 
failure state(s) of utmost (M–4) function modules. 
The 3-of-M DMMR design, as a minimum, should 
incorporate 5 identical function modules (i.e. M = 5) 
with 3 identical function modules constituting the 
majority logic group and the remaining 2 function 
modules constituting the minority logic group called 
the 3-of-5 DMMR design.  
     The biggest advantage of the (3-of-M) DMMR 
scheme is that with the introduction of every extra 
function module in the minority logic group the fault 
tolerance of the DMMR scheme proportionately 
increases by unity. It is worth noting here that 2 
function modules have to be added to an NMR design 
to increase its fault tolerance by unity while only 1 
function module has to be added to a (3-of-M) 
DMMR design to enhance its fault tolerance by unity 
[7]. This is indeed beneficial given that without any 
compromise on the fault tolerance, the design weight 
and cost could be significantly reduced in the DMMR 
scheme compared to the conventional NMR scheme 
due to the usage of less function module(s), and thus 
the design metrics would be better optimized in the 
case of the former compared to the latter.  
     This article for the first time presents the FPGAs 
based implementation of example (3-of-M) DMMR 
designs and compares it with counterpart NMR 
designs for fault or failure tolerances of 2, 3 and 4 
function modules. The rest of this article is organized 
into 3 sections. Section 2 briefly discusses the NMR 
and DMMR system architectures. Section 3 describes 
example implementations of NMR and DMMR 
circuits targeting four different FPGAs viz. two 
commercial FPGAs (Spartan 3E and Virtex 5), a 
radiation-tolerant FPGA (QPro Virtex 2) and a 
military grade FPGA (QPro Virtex E), and presents 
the synthesis results obtained viz. area and delay 
combined into the area-delay product (i.e. ADP). 
Lastly Section 4 gives the conclusions.  
 
 
2 Description of NMR and DMMR 
Schemes  
The generic architectures of the NMR and DMMR 
schemes are succinctly discussed in this section.      
 
2.1 NMR Scheme  
The general architecture of the NMR scheme is 
depicted through Figure 1. A similar set of inputs is 
supplied to all the N identical function modules from 
the external environment. In Figure 1, the outputs of 
N identical function modules viz. M1 to MN of NMR 
are combined using a majority voter which produces 
the NMR design output (NMRO) after performing 
majority voting on the function modules outputs. At 
the least (N+1)/2 out of the N identical function 
modules should operate correctly to withstand the 
faulty or failure state(s) of a maximum of (N–1)/2 
function modules.  
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Fig. 1 Block schematic of NMR scheme 
 
     The basic NMR scheme corresponds to the 3MR 
scheme (i.e. triple modular redundancy or TMR) 
where 3 identical function modules are used and the 
faulty or failure state of at most 1 function module is 
tolerated. 5MR, wherein 5 identical function modules 
are used would guarantee the correct operation 
provided at most 2 function modules may become 
faulty or fail at random. In 7MR, 7 identical function 
modules are used and at least 4 function modules 
should operate correctly thus being able to 
accommodate the faulty or failure state of at most 3 
function modules. 9 identical function modules are 
used in the 9MR and a minimum of 5 function 
modules must maintain the correct operation to 
successfully mask the faulty or failure state of a 
maximum of 4 function modules. Hence it becomes 
clear that according to the NMR scheme, 2 identical 
function modules have to be added to a NMR design 
in order to enhance its fault tolerance by unity. This 
poses major drawbacks in terms of exaggerating the 
design metrics and substantially increasing the design 
weight and cost. Moreover the voters’ complexity of 
the NMR scheme [7] also increases considerably 
with an increase in the NMR design hierarchy.  
 
2.2 DMMR Scheme  
The general DMMR architecture is shown in Figure 
2 that consists of M identical function modules which 
are split into two groups as the ‘majority logic group’ 
comprising the function modules F1, F2 and F3, and 
the ‘minority logic group’ comprising the function 
modules F4 to FM. The majority and minority logic 
groups are shown enclosed in brown and blue 
rectangles respectively in Figure 2. The DMMR voter 
is highlighted by the pink rectangle in Figure 2. The 
majority voter, which forms part of the DMMR voter, 
performs majority voting on only the majority logic 
group function modules outputs viz. F1, F2 and F3 and 
produces the intermediate output MAJ. The gate level 
detail of the 3-input majority voter [9] is shown in 
dotted lines in Figure 2, and is similar to the carry 
output logic of the binary full adder [12]. The outputs 
of the minority logic group function modules viz. F4 
to FM are combined using an OR gate whose output 
is MIN. The logical conjunction of MAJ and MIN 
yields the DMMR design output i.e. DMMRO. The 
logic equations of MAJ, MIN and DMMRO are 
given below. In (1), (2) and (3), ‘+’ signifies logical 
disjunction and ‘●’ or the product signifies logical 
conjunction.  
 
MAJ = F1F2 + F2F3 + F1F3                                                           (1) 
 
MIN = F4 + F5 +…+ FM                                         (2) 
 
DMMRO = MAJ ● MIN                                       (3) 
 
     To briefly discuss the DMMR design architecture, 
let us first assume that the correct steady-state of all 
the function module outputs viz. F1 to FM should be 
binary 1 in Figure 2. Supposing due to faults or 
failures of function module 3 and function modules 5 
to M, let us presume their outputs are corrupted. As a 
result, F3 and F5 up to FM assume binary 0. Hence, as 
per our assumptions, F1 = F2 = F4 = 1. Since F1 and 
F2 are 1, as per (1), MAJ would evaluate to 1. Since 
F4 = 1, MIN equates to 1 as per (2) although F5 up to 
FM have incorrectly assumed binary 0 due to faults or 
failures. Since MAJ and MIN are 1, as per (3) the 
DMMR architecture outputs 1 on DMMRO which is 
correct.  
 
 
 
Fig. 2 Block schematic of (3-of-M) DMMR scheme 
 
     On similar lines, when all the function module 
outputs say F1 to FM should be binary 0 and if only 
F1, F2 and F4 are binary 0 and the rest of the outputs 
viz. F3 and F5 up to FM assume binary 1 incorrectly, 
as per (1) and (2), we find that MAJ would evaluate 
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to binary 0 which is correct but MIN would evaluate 
to binary 1 which is incorrect. Nevertheless, as per 
(3), DMMRO would correctly equate to binary 0 
implying that the DMMR system architecture is able 
to successfully mask the faulty or failure states of 
various function modules and could guarantee the 
correct operation provided the Boolean majority and 
minority logic conditions are simultaneously upheld 
in the corresponding majority and minority logic 
groups of the function modules shown in Figure 2.  
     The majority logic group can withstand the failure 
or faulty state of anyone of the 3 function modules 
among F1, F2 and F3. The minority logic group is 
more accommodative and can withstand the faulty or 
failure state(s) of all but one of the function modules 
among F4 to FM. This implies that the introduction of 
each extra function module in the minority logic 
group increases the fault tolerance of the DMMR 
scheme by unity. This is advantageous since the 
NMR scheme requires the addition of 2 function 
modules to improve its fault tolerance by unity. 
Hence, given this, the DMMR scheme could help in 
reducing the number of function modules used 
compared to the NMR scheme in order to achieve the 
same degree of fault tolerance whilst being able to 
reduce the design weight and cost and also help in 
optimizing the design metrics.   
 
 
3 Example FPGA Based Realizations 
of NMR and DMMR Circuits – Results 
and Discussion  
Two commercial Xilinx FPGA families viz. Spartan 
3E (Device: XC3S1600E) and Virtex 5 (Device: 
XC5VLX30T) corresponding to 90nm and 65nm 
CMOS processes, a radiation-tolerant FPGA family 
viz. QPro Virtex 2 (Device: XQR2V1000), and a 
military grade FPGA family viz. QPro Virtex E 
(Device: XQV600E) corresponding to 150nm and 
180nm CMOS processes have been considered as the 
FPGA implementation platforms. The radiation-
tolerant and military grade FPGA families are 
particularly considered since the NMR and DMMR 
schemes are generally suitable for deployment in 
mission and safety-critical applications. A 4×4 Braun 
array multiplier [10] portrayed by Figure 3 has been 
considered as the representative function module 
although any function module representing any 
electronic circuit or system could be considered for 
the NMR or DMMR designs depending upon the 
target application.  
     FPGAs based implementations of example 5MR, 
7MR and 9MR circuits, and their respective 
redundant counterparts viz. 3-of-5 DMMR, 3-of-6 
DMMR and 3-of-7 DMMR circuits as per the generic 
NMR and (3-of-M) DMMR architectures shown in 
Figures 1 and 2 were considered for comparison. The 
5MR, 7MR and 9MR circuits correspond to the 
generic NMR scheme, and the 3-of-5 DMMR, 3-of-
6 DMMR and 3-of-7 DMMR circuits correspond to 
the generic (3-of-M) DMMR scheme. The redundant 
circuits comprise identical function modules and 
different voter circuits. The voters corresponding to 
various NMR and (3-of-M) DMMR schemes were 
implemented according to the gate-level schematics 
given in [9] [11].  
 
 
 
Fig. 3 Logic schematic of 4×4 array multiplier 
 
     In the 3-of-5, 3-of-6 and 3-of-7 DMMR circuits, 3 
function modules constitute their majority logic 
groups while their respective minority logic groups 
comprise 2, 3 and 4 function modules each. The 5MR 
and 3-of-5 DMMR circuits both consist of 5 function 
modules and both these provide maximum fault or 
failure tolerance capability of 2 function modules. 
The 7MR circuit comprises 7 function modules while 
the 3-of-6 DMMR circuit consists of only 6 function 
modules. However the 3-of-6 DMMR circuit despite 
requiring 1 function module less than the 7MR circuit 
features a similar fault or failure tolerance capability 
of maximum of 2 function modules as its counterpart. 
The 9MR circuit consists of 9 function modules while 
the 3-of-7 DMMR circuit consists of just 7 function 
modules. The 3-of-7 DMMR circuit despite requiring 
2 function modules less than the 9MR circuit exhibits 
a similar fault or failure tolerance capability of 
maximum of 4 function modules as its counterpart. 
These mean the area occupancy, critical path delay 
and ADP metrics of the 3-of-6 DMMR and 3-of-7 
DMMR circuits would be favorably optimized i.e. 
less than the corresponding design parameters of 
7MR and 9MR circuits as substantiated by the results 
given in Table 1.  
     Table 1 gives the simulation results viz. area in 
terms of the number of basic logic elements (BELs) 
P. Balasubramanian, N.e. Mastorakis
International Journal of Circuits and Electronics 
http://www.iaras.org/iaras/journals/ijce
ISSN: 2367-8879 188 Volume 1, 2016
and the critical path delay corresponding to 5MR, 
7MR, 9MR, 3-of-5 DMMR, 3-of-6 DMMR and 3-of-
7 DMMR circuits based on the four different FPGAs 
considered. The corresponding ADP values are also 
mentioned in the last column of Table 1.  
     
Table 1. (Critical path) delay, area, and ADP values 
of 5MR, 7MR, 9MR, 3-of-5 DMMR, 3-of-6 DMMR 
and 3-of-7 DMMR circuits corresponding to 
different Xilinx FPGA families 
Redundancy 
specification 
Delay 
(ns) 
Area 
( BELs) 
ADP 
value 
Spartan 3E (90nm CMOS) 
Type – Commercial  
5MR 13.056 187 2441.472 
7MR 16.550 327 5411.85 
9MR 16.493 460 7586.78 
3-of-5 DMMR 13.794 179 2469.126 
3-of-6 DMMR 13.949 211 2943.239 
3-of-7 DMMR 13.721 246 3375.366 
Virtex 5 (65nm CMOS process) 
Type – Commercial 
5MR 6.953 107 743.971 
7MR 7.149 162 1158.138 
9MR 7.990 248 1981.52 
3-of-5 DMMR 7.352 109 801.368 
3-of-6 DMMR 6.957 129 897.453 
3-of-7 DMMR 7.999 154 1231.846 
QPro Virtex 2 (150nm CMOS process)  
Type: Radiation tolerant 
5MR 16.156 187 3021.172 
7MR 20.056 327 6558.312 
9MR 20.208 460 9295.68 
3-of-5 DMMR 16.701 179 2989.479 
3-of-6 DMMR 16.712 211 3526.232 
3-of-7 DMMR 16.504 246 4059.984 
QPro Virtex E (180nm CMOS process) 
Type: Military grade 
5MR 18.937 187 3541.219 
7MR 23.901 327 7815.627 
9MR 25.934 478 12396.452 
3-of-5 DMMR 19.713 179 3528.627 
3-of-6 DMMR 20.195 211 4261.145 
3-of-7 DMMR 20.030 246 4927.38 
 
     The 5MR and 3-of-5 DMMR circuits feature the 
same number of function modules (i.e. five). Hence 
the area occupied by their function modules would be 
the same while there may be minor variations in the 
area occupancies of their respective voter circuits. 
Since the critical path delay is the summation of 
maximum propagation delays encountered in the 
function module and the voter and interconnects, the 
data path delay encountered in the function module 
would be roughly constant while the propagation 
delays encountered in the respective voters and in the 
interconnect of 5MR and 3-of-5 DMMR circuits may 
slightly differ. Hence there is likely to be only a slight 
difference in the area and delay parameters of the 
5MR and 3-of-5 DMMR circuits as seen in Table 1.  
     When considering the ADP values of different 
redundant circuits it can be seen from Table 1 that in 
the case of the commercial FPGAs, the ADPs of 5MR 
circuits are quite lower than the ADPs of 3-of-5 
DMMR circuits while in the case of the radiation-
tolerant and military grade FPGAs, the ADPs of the 
3-of-5 DMMR circuits are quite lower than the ADPs 
of the 5MR circuits. Overall, across the four FPGAs 
considered, the 5MR and 3-of-5 DMMR circuits 
feature quite similar ADP values. When increases in 
redundancy orders are considered for the NMR and 
(3-of-M) DMMR designs it can be seen in Table 1 
that the latter significantly outperforms the former in 
terms of the ADP without compromising on the fault 
tolerance. The main reason for this is the requirement 
of less number of function modules for the (3-of-M) 
DMMR scheme compared to the NMR scheme and 
partly because of the reduced logic complexities of 
higher order (3-of-M) DMMR voters compared to the 
respective higher order NMR voter circuits.  
     Referring to Table 1, it can be noted that with 
respect to the two commercial FPGAs considered for 
physical realization, the 3-of-6 DMMR circuit 
achieves average reduction in ADP by 34.1% 
compared to the 7MR circuit. With respect to the 
radiation-tolerant and military grade FPGAs 
considered for physical realization, the 3-of-6 
DMMR circuit achieves average reduction in ADP 
by about 46% compared to the 7MR circuit. Again 
referring to Table 1, with respect to the two 
commercial FPGAs considered for physical 
realization, the 3-of-7 DMMR circuit achieves 
average reduction in ADP by 46.7% compared to the 
9MR circuit. With respect to the radiation-tolerant 
and military grade FPGAs considered for physical 
synthesis, the 3-of-7 DMMR circuit achieves average 
reduction in ADP by 58.3% than the 9MR circuit.       
 
 
4 Conclusion   
In the era of nanoelectronics, reliability and fault 
tolerance of circuits and systems assumes increasing 
importance due to several complex technological 
issues such as random dopant fluctuations, high heat 
flux, electro-migration, hot carrier effects, negative 
bias temperature stability, stress-induced variation, 
electrostatic discharge, process-induced defects, and 
metrology and other manufacturing defects.  
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     Redundancy is usually implicit in the design of 
mission and safety-critical electronic circuits and 
systems to successfully overcome any unexpected 
fault(s) or failure(s) which might occur during the 
normal operation. In this context, the NMR scheme 
is a well-known method for implementing redundant 
circuits and systems. However, with multiple faults 
increasingly likely to become commonplace in 
nanoelectronic circuits and systems, NMR is not 
considered to be efficient to implement higher levels 
of redundancy entirely or selectively in a mission or 
safety-critical circuit or system design due to the 
exaggerated increases in design weight, cost and 
design metrics. Given this, the DMMR scheme forms 
a good alternative. Without compromising on the 
fault tolerance, the DMMR scheme is able to 
facilitate reductions in design cost and weight and 
also could optimize the design metrics better 
compared to the NMR scheme due to the requirement 
of less number of function modules and less complex 
voters for implementing higher levels of redundancy.  
     This article has considered the FPGA based 
realizations of example NMR circuits and their 
counterpart DMMR circuits. In particular, two 
commercial FPGAs, a radiation-tolerant FPGA and a 
military grade FPGA were considered as the 
implementation platforms. In order to achieve 
maximum fault tolerances of 2, 3 and 4 function 
modules, the 5MR, 7MR and 9MR circuits 
corresponding to the generic NMR scheme and their 
respective redundant counterparts viz. 3-of-5 
DMMR, 3-of-6 DMMR and 3-of-7 DMMR circuits 
corresponding to the generic (3-of-M) DMMR 
scheme were considered for physical realization. The 
5MR and 3-of-5 DMMR circuits have almost the 
same design metrics since both these require the same 
number of function modules. However it was 
observed that the reductions in identical function 
modules in the case of the 3-of-6 DMMR and 3-of-7 
DMMR circuits compared to the 7MR and 9MR 
circuits, and the reduced logic complexities of 3-of-6 
DMMR and 3-of-7 DMMR voters compared to the 
counterpart 7MR and 9MR voter circuits translated 
into significant reductions in ADP for the former 
compared to the latter.  
     Across the four different FPGA families 
considered for physical implementation, the 3-of-6 
DMMR circuits feature average reduction in ADP by 
44.5% compared to the 7MR circuits, and the 3-of-7 
DMMR circuits exhibit average reduction in ADP by 
56.5% compared to the 9MR circuits. Hence the 
important inference from this research work is that to 
implement higher levels of redundancy in FPGA-
based mission and safety-critical circuits and systems 
entirely or selectively to achieve enhanced fault 
tolerance, the DMMR scheme forms an efficient 
alternative to the NMR scheme whilst being able to 
optimize the design metrics, weight and cost.   
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